We examine competition among six market centers for NYSE-listed stocks using SEC Rule 11ac-5 data. We find that: market centers competing with the NYSE execute orders in only a subset of stocks, order types and order sizes, that differences in effective spreads are generally much smaller than suggested by comparisons of overall averages though reliable differences remain, that order flow routed to the NYSE is substantially more informed that order flow routed to broker-dealers and other exchanges (though less informed than marketable limit orders routed to ECNs), and that prevailing spreads differ at time of order arrival. More importantly, we find that differences in effective spreads between the NYSE and some market centers are related to characteristics of the stocks traded. Taken together, our results suggest that competition among market centers is imperfect and that some market centers carve out profitable niches in the stocks they trade and/or the orders they execute.
and order type), some market centers execute orders in only a subset of stocks, typically execute smaller orders, and/or predominantly execute a specific order type.
Given the differences in trading activity, we use category-by-category comparisons to compare execution statistics for the NYSE with those of competing market centers. For marketable limit orders, NYSE effective spreads are reliably lower than those at all the market centers we examine. For market orders, NYSE effective spreads are reliably lower than spreads at four of six market centers and reliably higher than those at the remaining two. For example, effective spreads on the NYSE for very small market orders are about a half penny lower than for Knight Securities and about a half penny higher than for Madoff Securities. We note that these results are remarkably different than results based on market center averages, in which NYSE effective spreads are three to seven pennies higher than competing market centers. This illustrates the extent to which selectivity characterizes competing market centers and the importance of appropriate controls when making comparisons.
We find that order flow routed to the NYSE is substantially more informed than order flow routed to broker-dealers and other exchanges. For ECN Archipelago, there is no difference in information for market orders, though marketable limit orders routed to Archipelago are typically more informed than those routed to the NYSE. For example, after the arrival of very small market or marketable limit orders at the NYSE, prices move about twice as much as they do following similar orders at broker-dealers or other exchanges. Notably, the differences in information are far greater than the differences in effective spreads and, as a result, the NYSE has substantially lower realized spreads than all other market centers except Archipelago. 5 We also examine quoted spreads at the time of order submission. In general, prevailing quoted spreads are larger at the time small orders arrive at the NYSE than they are when small orders arrive at competing market centers. The reverse is true for larger orders. Notably, those market centers with effective spreads smaller than the NYSE are those that execute orders when prevailing spreads are narrower. These results suggest that order difficulty and order timing are important dimensions along which competing market centers (intentionally or unintentionally) specialize.
Most importantly, we find that differences in effective spreads between the NYSE and some competing market centers vary systematically in the cross-section of stocks.
For example, the quintile of firms where the difference in effective spreads between
Madoff Securities and the NYSE is greatest in July 2001, is reliably greater over the remaining year. Examining potential sources of these persistent differences, we find that market centers compete more successfully in lower volume firms, more volatile firms, in smaller order sizes, and where the NYSE provides the least price improvement. 6 While our earlier results suggest that market centers may compete by selectively executing orders based on order and market characteristics, these results suggest that whatever strategies are chosen are not equally effective across all stocks.
5 While the effective spread is the difference between execution prices and value of a security at the time of order placement, the realized spread is the difference between the execution price and a subsequent value of the security. The difference is due to price movements subsequent to order placement and reflects order difficulty due either to characteristics of the order or market conditions around the time of order execution. For this reason, realized spreads can be considered a measure of the gross revenue to providers of liquidity and are indicative of the expected cost of execution when order characteristics are controlled for. 6 The phrase "competing more effectively" is used here as a comment on the comparative ability of one market center over another, not the absolute ability. For example, effective spreads on the Chicago Stock Exchange are typically higher than effective spreads on the NYSE. However, for those stocks with lower Taken together, our results suggest that competition for execution services in NYSE-listed stocks is characterized more by fragmentation and specialization than the introduction of universally better market designs. In particular, non-ECN market centers seem to screen order flow to select less informed orders and more favorable market conditions, and this screening ability varies across stocks. The ECN in our study attracts more informed marketable limit orders than the NYSE, which suggests there is no screening and that the ECNs may be the chosen venue for difficult orders and/or at difficult times. If we view competition among market centers as a search for profitable market niches rather than a search for better market architectures, then our results suggest that these opportunities are defined by order and market conditions.
Our results are related to a number of studies comparing market centers. In contrast to Lee (1993) , Huang and Stoll (1994) and Blume and Goldstein (1997) , we find that the regional exchanges are not uniformly more costly than the NYSE. Our results also contrast those of Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2002) , who find that institutional orders routed to ECNs are less costly to execute than orders routed to the listing market.
On the other hand, our results are consistent with Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2002) and Huang (2002) who find that ECN spreads are higher than those at the listing exchange and that ECNs appear to attract more informed order flow. We augment this line of inquiry by adding results on broker-dealers, which are organized quite differently than exchanges or ECNs.
While a number of papers point out that order routing agreements can be used by market centers to draw more profitable uninformed order flow (cream skimming), volume, the difference between the market centers is lower. In this case we would say the Chicago Stock empirical results are mixed. Easley, Keifer and O'Hara (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) provide supporting evidence whereas Battalio (1997) does not. 7 We provide direct evidence of substantial cream skimming and our evidence suggests, furthermore, that such order routing strategies may vary in effectiveness depending on characteristics of traded stocks. The exact nature of the strategies that support cream skimming for NYSE-listed securities and the reasons they vary in effectiveness is an area that merits additional study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market centers we examine and describes the Dash5 statistics. Section 3 discusses the data used for the study. Section 4 examines issues related to the calculation and appropriate use of Dash5 statistics and uses the statistics to evaluate execution quality. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
Market Centers and Dash5 Data Details
The landscape for execution services has been evolving at a rapid pace. A decade ago the central question was whether the regional exchanges were sufficient competition for the NYSE. Now there is a proliferation of trading venues and these venues employ vastly differing technologies and execution procedures. Even these details are changing at every moment. Below we discuss the market centers examined in this study.
Exchange competes more effectively in lower volume stocks. 7 Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1997) , describe the arrangements and agreements that route order flow to various market centers. Related evidence and discussions can be found in Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1997) , Bloomfield and O'Hara (1998), and Dutta and Madhavan (1997) . Consistent with the effects of order routing, Blume and Goldstein (1997) find that orders do not always flow to the market center posting the best prices and Bessembinder (2002a) links higher trading costs on the regional exchanges to orders being routed to regional exchanges when their quotes are not competitive.
Following that we discuss the Dash5 data that are required by the SEC and used in this study.
1 Market Centers
The NYSE is a centralized continuous auction market. All orders are routed to a single specialist who is responsible for maintaining an orderly market in the traded stock.
The NYSE has both a physical trading floor and an electronic order routing system (SuperDot). 8 The orders routed through SuperDot are the only NYSE orders subject to Dash5 reporting. The NYSE is the listing exchange for the stocks we examine. It is also, as we shall see, the dominant venue for order routing. For this reason, and to simplify the analysis, we will evaluate results at other market centers relative to the NYSE.
We examine six market centers in addition to the NYSE. Below is a description of each over the time period studied, classified by type of market center: Knight, and Madoff are broker-dealers who provide execution services specifically for their clients. We note that one contribution of this study to examine broker-dealers and that these market centers have the greatest degree of flexibility in limiting the services they provide. Archipelago is an ECN and is essentially order driven electronic markets that also accept all orders in the stocks for which they make markets. The NYSE along with Boston, Chicago and Cincinnati are stock exchanges and accept all orders in the stocks for which they make markets. Of these four, the NYSE and Boston retain traditional trading floors.
Broker-Dealers

2 The Details of SEC Rule 11Ac 1-5
This section discusses the critical features of the Dash5 data. From the many measures of execution quality that are available, Dash5 rules require the following:
Effective Spread. The effective spread is equal to twice the difference between the price at which an order is executed and the midpoint of a benchmark quote, multiplied by -1 for sell orders. 10 The benchmark mid-quote should represent the price that would be obtained in the absence of transaction costs. Since the Dash5 statistics are based on orders (not transactions), the benchmark quote for Dash5 data is the prevailing quote at the time the order arrives at the market center.
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Realized Spread. The realized spread is twice the difference between the execution price and the mid-quote five minutes after execution, multiplied by -1 for sell orders. The mid-quote represents the subsequent value of the security and 9 A detailed description of the procedures at each would be voluminous and almost instantaneously out of date. Even the names are changing and centers are consolidating (we retain the names at the time of study). Fortunately, these details are not relevant since the point of this analysis is to characterize competition in general, not to comment on efficacy of any specific design feature. The market centers themselves provide ample descriptions of their protocols. 10 The combination of the best bid and the best offer across all quotes is referred to as the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). This is the quote that is used to benchmark Dash5 data. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to quoted spreads means the NBBO. 11 The order arrival benchmark is more appropriate than an execution time benchmark because the effective spread will reflect any price movements that occur while an order is being executed. These price movements reflect real costs to traders and may differ across market centers. As mentioned previously, one advantage of Dash5 data is the accuracy of the results. the realized spread, therefore, reflects the gross trading profit to a liquidity provider from taking the other side of an order. The difference between effective and realized spreads reflects is the permanent price impact of the order. This impact reflects the difficulty of the order -essentially the expected information content of the order.
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Time to Execution. The time from order arrival until it is executed.
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Price Improvement. Price improvement measures the execution price relative to the quoted bid price for sell orders or the quoted ask for buy orders. In other words, it describes the execution relative to the execution price that would have occurred against the quoted spread at the time of order arrival.
14 From the price improvement and effective spread data, one can infer the prevailing quote at the time of order arrival. We examine quoted spreads since they reflect market and order flow conditions at the time of order arrival. 15 Note that effective spreads not only reflect prevailing market conditions, but also reflect characteristics of the order, such as order size, that cannot be reflected in the quoted spread (see Blume and Goldstein (1992) result of routing an order to a given market center. 16 Note that categories are determined by order size, while the share weighting is based on executed shares. For example, an order for 3,000 shares might execute in two equal parts, each part with a different execution result. The results would be weighted by the shares executed and reported in the medium size order category even though it executed in two parts each of which would be classified as a small order. The purpose is to represent the expected execution results for the order submitted. It is also the order characteristics, not execution sizes, which reflect the difficulty of executing an order. 17 It should be noted that the Dash5 data are not audited. We examined the data for instances of observations that were internally inconsistent. Specifically, we looked for cases where the implied quoted spread was negative. Three market centers had inconsistent observations: Boston with 1 error out of 42,093 observations, Madoff with 46 errors out of 14,349 observations, and Cincinnati with 158 errors out of 26,880 observations. The average error was 2 pennies, 3.76 pennies, and 18.25 pennies, respectively. Consider the following example of an error. One category for Cincinnati showed a single order with an effective spread equal to zero (execution at the midpoint), and disimprovement of 24 pennies (execution statistics that disproportionately reflect the results that type of trader might expect.
Furthermore, the categories do not acknowledge any differences in prevailing market conditions at the time an order is executed. For example, it is possible that orders are routed to a given market center when conditions for execution are most favorable and this market center's reported Dash5 statistics will be disproportionately determined by easy executions. the results differed little between these two samples, so we present results for the outside the quote). Clearly, an order cannot execute at the mid-point of the quote and outside the quote with positive prevailing quotes. 18 Additional categories would, of course, yield better comparisons. However, the realized spread does provide implicit controls on market conditions and order difficulty.
combined sample of 350 firms except for sample summary statistics, which are presented in Table 1 .
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The first section of Table 1 describes the characteristics of the companies whose stocks are studied. Not surprisingly, the most active stocks are substantially larger firms and firms with a slightly higher share prices than the less active firms. The second section of Table 1 describes the trading activity in the stocks, including the activity for orders subject to Dash5 statistics that are directed to the market centers we study. By construction, the most active stocks have substantially higher consolidated trading volume than the less active stocks -more than ten times more volume, on average.
As for Dash 5 activity, for the most active stocks, there are 2,511 market orders, 1,392 marketable limit orders, and 4,363 non-marketable limit orders placed each day, on average. For the less active stocks, trading activity is much lower: there are 227 market orders, 226 marketable limit orders, and 1,078 non-marketable limit orders placed each day, on average. Shares placed, as expected, follow the pattern in orders placed. Table 1 also presents summary statistics for shares executed. As expected, virtually all the market orders are executed. Interestingly, about 20% of marketable limit orders are unexecuted. This reflects the fact that the determination of status of a limit order as "marketable" is made at the time of order arrival. Between that time and the time the order is made available for execution (e.g. the time at which it is displayed to the specialist), prices may have moved away from the limit order. Finally, less than one third of non-marketable limit orders are executed. These results show that there are clear differences in the samples for each of the market centers and we explore this further below. At this point, we note that the stocks in which competing market centers tend to have observations are the lower volume stocks, and that competing market centers tend to have smaller average order sizes. 21 For example, the total consolidated volume in the 184 stocks for which Madoff has observations is about 10% lower than for the NYSE, while the average order size for Madoff order flow is about 20% lower than order flow at the NYSE.
22 20 The maximum number of categories is 84,000 (350 stocks × 12 months × 4 order sizes × 5 order types). Thus, there are many cases of categories without observations. Even the NYSE has observations in only about 78% of the categories. These null observations, as might be expected, are predominantly in the larger order sizes and less active stocks. 21 As expected, but not reported, the competing market centers therefore have more observations in the smaller order size categories. 22 These differences are far more pronounced for the less active sample since most of the market centers do make markets in the more active stocks.
Differences Between the NYSE and Competing Market Centers
1 Method of Comparison
Since market centers do not execute orders in every category and/or every firm, one has to be careful using Dash5 data to evaluate differences between any two market centers. In this section we highlight the magnitude of potential errors from inappropriate comparisons, illustrate the approach taken for the remainder of our analyses, and provide summary statistics for the magnitude of effective spreads (measured in various ways) at each market center. We consider three ways to make comparisons:
Simple Average: Average the statistic across all categories and stocks, then compare market centers. Paired Differences by Stock: Create a weighted average for each stock, and then calculate the difference between pairs of market centers for a given stock when there is an observation for both market centers. Paired differences can be averaged to compare market centers. Paired Differences by Category: Calculate the difference between pairs of market centers for every category where there is an observation for both market centers. Paired differences can be averaged to compare market centers.
The first approach is most simple, but will be distorted the most by variations in executed volume among market centers. For example, a market center that trades only high volume stocks will have a much lower average spread than a market center that also trades low volume stocks -regardless of actual execution quality. The next approach accounts for volume differences by volume weighting statistics and accounts for stock selection by comparing only stocks with observations. The final approach most closely adheres to the concept of holding all things constant -it looks at category-level differences (which includes the stock). Note that the last two approaches do not provide a simple single statistic that characterizes a given market center, though they do summarize the difference across any two market centers. Table 3 presents our analysis of effective spread differences for market orders using the approaches outlined above. For each method, there is a column labeled "NYSE vs Other" which shows the inferred difference between the NYSE and the given market center using each approach. Consider the simple average across all category observations. The effective spread on the NYSE averages 11.50 pennies across all categories/stocks. The effective spread for other market centers varies from a low of 3.81 pennies (Madoff) to a high of 8.40 pennies (Knight). The NYSE effective spread is higher in every case and almost three times higher in some cases. All these differences are significant.
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Next we calculate weighted average spreads by stock and look at the distribution of stock-pair differences. This approach yields conclusions that are remarkably different from the simple average comparison. In particular, the only reliable differences are for three of the market centers and the magnitude of the differences is substantially attenuated relative to the simple average. Note the variation across market centers in the number of observations -while many market centers have observations for virtually all stocks, others do not. For example, Cincinnati only has observations for 149 stocks and Madoff has observations for just over half the stocks. 23 One could also generate a share-weighted average. The results are not reported. However, we find that effective spreads are much lower: the NYSE effective spread drops precipitously to 4.57 pennies and the effective spread for other market centers ranges from a low of 1.99 pennies (Madoff again) to a high of 6.00 pennies (Instinet). More importantly, the inferences are changed. The NYSE has a lower trading cost than two of the other market centers and, in general, there is less difference across market centers. This shows that, on average, there is more aggregate volume in the smaller order sizes.
The final approach makes the most complete use of the data. This approach calculates the difference across market centers for every category/stock. Here we find that differences across some market centers just about vanish. For example, the difference between the NYSE and Cincinnati is about 2 hundredths of a penny. In this study, NYSE effective spreads are higher than two market centers and lower than three.
Once again, it is important to note the variation across market center comparisons in the number of observations (categories) -from a low of 5,111 (Cincinnati) to a high of 13,752 (Knight). Given that we are examining market orders only, the maximum number of categories is 16,800 (350 stocks × 4 order sizes × 12 months).
In general, these results identify statistically reliable differences among market centers, though the magnitude is substantially smaller than what is suggested by looking at simple averages. This illustrates the importance of looking at category level differences when drawing inferences. 24 In our subsequent analysis we will maintain this approach when documenting and exploring differences between market centers.
2 Comparisons of Market Centers
We compare each market center with the NYSE in a series of tables that look at various Dash5 measures of execution quality. We begin by looking at spreads and spread components (realized spread and information component). We then examine price improvement, prevailing quoted spreads, and time to execution.
Spreads and Spread Components
The Dash5 statistics require reporting of effective spread and realized spread only for market and marketable limit orders. As discussed above, the effective spread is the cost to the trader, the realized spread is the gross revenue to liquidity providers (not necessarily the market maker or specialist). The difference is created by price movements subsequent to order arrival and reflects order difficulty, possibly due to the information implicit in the order (for this reason it is referred to as the information component of the spread). Table 4 presents the analysis of spread components for very small orders. This table illustrates the analysis performed for each category. To conserve space, we will thereafter present summary tables covering all categories. We chose to present the details for the smallest orders since these are most likely to be retail orders and much of the discussion and concern about order routing relates to the treatment of retail orders.
Furthermore, the results for very small orders are typical of many of the results we find.
In table 4, for each market center and order type, we provide the median of the indicated measure and, more importantly, we provide the median paired difference between the NYSE and the given market center. For simplicity, we present the median for the NYSE but not the median NYSE value for each market center comparison. 25 We include the number of pairs (in this case equal to the number of stocks since we are examining a single order size and type) used in the comparison so the reader can be aware of the extent to which the sample might differ in each comparison. For each paired 25 The NYSE average for each market center comparison would be calculated only for those pairs of observations (stock and order category) for which the NYSE and the market center both have valid observations. In most cases, this NYSE average for each comparison is very close to the NYSE overall average. We are noting this simplification only because the average paired difference will not be equal to the differences in the presented averages.
test we not only list the median paired difference, but we indicate the proportion of pairs for which the NYSE value is greater (the proportion of strictly positive differences).
Associated with each paired difference is a test of statistical significance. These are based on non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 26 The first two columns indicate the number of pairs and the median number of shares executed in that category on the indicated market center. Consistent with our earlier results, the NYSE is far more active than any other market center and is active in at least as many of the stocks as any other market center. Note that the NYSE has far more marketable limit orders than all the other market centers.
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The next set of columns describes the comparison of effective spreads. For market orders, the NYSE effective spread is reliably larger than Madoff and Boston (though quite small in magnitude for Boston), and reliably smaller than two of the other market centers. For marketable limit orders, the NYSE has reliably lower effective spreads than every market center. The most notable differences in terms of magnitude are the results for Achipelago (over a penny worse than the NYSE) and Madoff (over a half-penny better than the NYSE). In terms of percentages of category pairs, Madoff has a lower effective spread 91% of the time, whereas Knight and Archipelago are lower only 22% and 24% of the time.
The third set of columns describes the realized spread. Here the evidence is fairly uniform. The NYSE is found to have reliably lower realized spreads than every other 26 The results for means, when significant, differ from the conclusions of medians in only one case. More often, but not frequently, the results for means are statistically insignificant while median tests are significant. 27 The raises an interesting question about order types. The choice between a regular market order and a marketable limit order may depend on the type of market center to which one is routing an order. It should market center for market orders and lower than all but one market center (for which there is no reliable difference) for marketable limit orders. The final set of columns describes the information component of the effective spreads. These results shed light on important differences in the nature of order flow across market centers. In the case of market orders, the NYSE has more difficult order flow than every other market center except, once again, Archipelago. Marketable limit orders are similar.
In general, the information component results are the mirror image of the realized spread results. In other words, the NYSE has effective spreads generally in line with other market centers, but the difficulty of the execution for NYSE order flow dramatically reduces liquidity provider gross trading revenues. In this context, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the realized spread differences and information component differences (both generally over a penny), are often much greater than for the effective spread differences. Table 5 summarizes the paired differences for market and marketable limit orders for all order sizes. For simplicity, we omit the other information from Tables 4. There are few distinctive patterns in these results that we have not observed in the very small orders. In general, however, we observe fewer significant differences in the large order size category. While not reported, it should be noted that the number of observations decreases dramatically as we move to larger order sizes, consistent with the evidence in Table 2 that competing market centers provide services predominantly to smaller orders.
Taken together, the 
Price Improvement, Quoted Spreads, and Time to Execution
There are two other dimensions of order execution that are emphasized in the Dash5 statistics. These are price improvement and time to execution. We begin with an analysis of price improvement. Recall that price improvement measures the price relative to the quoted spread. If the quoted spread represents a public benchmark price (like a suggested manufacturer's price), then price improvement is the discount from that
benchmark. An interesting characteristic of the data, mentioned earlier, is that the combination of effective spread and price improvement (specifically the effective spread plus twice the improvement) must be equal to the prevailing quoted spread at the time of order arrival.
Examining quoted spreads provides information on the market conditions associated with the time of order arrival. In particular, variations in quoted spreads will reflect variations in liquidity due to market conditions or recent order flow. Thus, we can compare the average quoted spread at order arrival time across market centers to obtain improve the relative performance of the NYSE.
another view (in addition to the information component) of the difficulty of executing order flow that is directed to various market centers.
The analysis of price improvement and quoted spreads is shown in Tables 6 in a format similar to Table 5 . Specifically, the table lists the median difference between the NYSE and the indicated market center. For market orders, the NYSE provides more price improvement than most market centers (no worse than any market center) for very small orders. As order size increases, competing market centers tend to provide better improvement to the point where, for large orders, all market centers provide better price improvement. As with most of the measures, for marketable limit orders, there is evidence the NYSE does better than every market center.
The quoted spread analysis provides interesting results, particularly in light of the price improvement results. For very smaller orders, prevailing spreads are typically narrower, on average, at the time of NYSE order arrivals than at the time of competing market center order arrivals. As with price improvement, this reverses as we mover to larger order sizes. For the large orders, spreads are substantially smaller on the NYSE at the time of NYSE arrivals than at the competing market centers at the time of competing market center arrivals. In fact, the magnitude of the improvement typically parallels the magnitude of the quote difference. Thus, though there is clearly selection in the timing of orders being routed to various market centers, price improvements offset most of the differences.
Most notably, the two market centers that typically provide lower effective spreads than the NYSE (Madoff and Boston) are the two market centers that capture order flow at times when prevailing quoted spreads are smaller. This suggests these market centers are executing orders when market conditions are more favorable. Put another way, the results suggest market centers are filling small niches in the provision of execution services and these niches may not be just customer niches, but market condition niches.
Our analysis of the time to execution is presented in Table 7 . The time to execution results vary by market center comparison, as might be expected given the differences in market center design. We find that only the broker-dealers Madoff and Knight provide execution times that are reliably shorter than the NYSE for market orders.
This is surprising in the case of Archipelago, Chicago and Cincinati since these are all electronic order driven markets. For marketable limit orders, the variation in execution time differences is much greater. In this case, Archipelago and Madoff are both faster. In general, the NYSE is faster than all the other exchanges, Archipelago is slower on market orders but faster for marketable limit orders, and the broker-dealer Madoff is reliably fast in every case.
Dispersion in Execution Quality Within Market Centers
In addition to the level of differences, it is important to assess the predictability of the difference. In other words, one might save a half a penny, on average, at a given market center, but that saving might be highly variable with extreme costs and extreme savings. We address this question by looking at the dispersion of reported results within each category. We concentrate on effective spreads, but results for other measures of execution quality provide similar inferences. is lower at the NYSE. In some cases the variation is much greater -notably at
Archipelago. This basic result holds true in for all the order sizes, except that Madoff variation becomes larger than the NYSE for larger order sizes. In general, the results suggest that order execution at the NYSE is more predictable than at other market centers with the exception of Madoff. The order driven ECN Archipelago provides executions with extremely high variability.
These results suggests that predictability of execution costs may be a factor that should be considered when choosing execution venues. It is not a statistic that is generated for each stock. However, the variation across stocks, when market centers trade similar stocks, gives some idea of the predictability of execution. The caveat is that the variation may be generated by variation across stocks, rather than within stocks.
However, since the NYSE trades every stock traded on other market centers, and the range will reflect the range across all stocks, we have evidence of greater consistency in NYSE results.
3 Execution Quality in the Cross-Section
In the prior sections, we examined differences in average Dash5 statistics between the NYSE and competing market centers. Our results suggest that market centers are competing with the NYSE by targeting segments of the market rather than by innovation in overall market design. If this is the case, then one might expect the ability to target segments of the market to vary depending on the stock being traded. For example, if
Madoff is able to cream skim less informed order flow by purchasing orders, they may be better able to screen orders in this fashion for less active stocks. We explore this possibility in this section by examining the cross-section of differences in effective spreads.
Persistence of Market Center Differences
We begin by establishing that differences in effective spreads between market centers for a given stock is persistent over time. Specifically, we establish that the crosssectional variation in differences persists over time. 28 This justifies our later tests that look for association between stock characteristics and the differences in spreads. Since we will be looking at variation across stocks, we normalize all spread differences by the average price of the stock during the month the data were generated. Thus, we perform our analysis on basis point differences.
To assess whether some market centers are consistently more or less costly venues for some stocks than others, we proceed as follows. 29 We take the effective spreads calculated for the first month of our sample (July 2001) and divide the stocks into quintiles based on the difference in effective spreads for each market center and the 28 Incidentally, we also validate that our earlier conclusions about spread differences are not an artifact of the sample by showing that the results hold monthly. 29 Note that we are looking for patterns across stocks in this analysis. Another possibility is that at certain times one market center might provide better execution services than another. However, we do not have the information needed to consider this possibility.
NYSE. 30 The first quintile is where the NYSE provides the highest effective spread relative to a given market center, and the fifth is where the NYSE provides the lowest effective spread relative to the given market center. We then calculate the difference for each of the subsequent 11 months based on the quintiles formed from the last month. We test whether the difference in the two extreme quintiles is significant using the time series over the 11 months.
Before we consider the statistical tests, Figure 1 presents the graph of all five quintiles for Madoff. For the stocks in quintile 5, the difference between NYSE effective spreads and Madoff were the most positive in July -and the difference for these stocks remains the most positive in every other month. For the stocks in quintile 1, the difference was least positive in July (actually negative). These stocks remained the least positive in every month. In fact, the ordering remains remarkably consistent over time.
This illustrates the concept we are examining in this section -whether there are patterns across stocks in how much better or worse execution is for one market center relative to another. After documenting the differences, we explore factors that might give rise to these differences. Table 9 presents the tests of persistence for effective spreads for the whole sample, by market center and order size. There were no reliable cross-sectional differences of Archipelago, possibly a function of the large variation in Archipelago results noted in Table 8 , and it has been omitted from this table. This may also reflect the possibility that this ECN does not screen order flow and, therefore, no variation would be 30 One could assign quintiles based on any month and results would be similar.
expected. More likely, ECNs compete by attracting orders under certain market conditions, rather than from certain stocks.
The differences in Table 9, like our earlier table, Chicago, at least half the order sizes exhibit persistent differences.
These results suggest that there are patterns in execution quality differences. It would seem that not all market centers provide comparable execution quality for all stocks.
Regression Analysis
In this section, we examine execution differences to see if they are related to characteristics of the stocks being traded. Specifically, we explore the relation between differences in effective spreads and firm characteristics in the cross section of firms. This analysis focuses on differences across stocks, so we use averages over our study period to prevent distortions related to pooling cross-sections and time-series. The dependent variable is the difference in relative effective spread calculated from the Dash5 data. The independent variables we examine are the following for each firm:
Quoted Spread
The trade-weighted average quoted relative spread, expressed in percent.
Price Improvement
The difference between relative quoted spreads and relative effective spreads, expressed as a percentage.
Turnover
The volume in the stock divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Log(Market Value)
The average of the daily log of market value.
Volatility
The standard deviation of the daily tradeweighted prices.
PIN
The probability of informed trading calculated using the methodology of Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and Paperman (1996) .
Size Indicators
Indicator variables for small, medium, and large orders (we omit an indicator for the very small orders).
These variables capture a number of possible determinants of effective competition. The quoted spread captures the opportunity for market centers to improve on spreads. Price improvement captures reflects the degree to which quotes are indicative of executions results -greater price improvement suggests that competition may be less driven by quote behavior and more related to preferencing and other arrangements (see Easley, Keifer, and O'Hara (1996) and Battalio (1997), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1997), Battalio, Greene and Jennings (1997) , and Bloomfield and O'Hara (1998), among others). This may provide greater opportunities for competition. Size and volume (turnover) reflect trading information and trading interest, respectively. Larger firms have more analysts and more investors who follow or are aware of a firm. Larger firms also have greater trading activity (see Arbel and Strebel (1982) , Merton (1987) Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , and
Irvine (2001), among others). All else equal, market centers may choose to compete in the most active securities or, instead, target their efforts to the less visible and less active securities. Volatility imposes a cost on market making by increasing the risks associated with holding inventory (Demsetz (1968) , Benston and Hagerman (1974), and Stoll (1978) ). This can affect competition market centers differed on their ability to absorb inventory risk.
Letting c represent a market center other than the NYSE, n represent the NYSE, s 
− =
To prevent or results from being driven by a few outliers, we include only those observations with at least 10 orders placed during a given month.
We then run the following regression for selected market centers: The results are given in Table 10 . We provide the number of observations for each regression as well as adjusted R-squares. Given that we are looking at averages across the year, the most observations we would expect to see would be 350 stocks × 4 order sizes = 1,400 observations. Adjusted R squares vary from 0.036 (Knight) to 0.345 (Madoff). Perhaps not surprisingly, Madoff is the market center that provides the greatest improvement upon NYSE quoted spreads and statistically significant in the most number of cases. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Madoff and Boston are the two market centers that improve upon the NYSE and have the two highest adjusted R squares -suggesting it is easier to explain better performance than worse.
Looking at the coefficients of the regressions we note the following. Market centers compete more effectively for lower turnover stocks (true in every case), for the smallest orders (true in every case), and where volatility is greater (true for two market centers). Results also show that Madoff does better for smaller stocks and Boston does better when quotes are wide. Results for price improvement are mixed, for Knight, Boston and Chicago, market centers compete less effectively when price improvement is high whereas Madoff does better when price improvement is high. In the case of Madoff this is consistent with greater opportunities to purchase order flow, while the result for the other three centers is hard to explain. It may be that the two exchanges do better when quotes are set more competitively and, one might expect, that aggressive quoting draws order flow. Note that the price improvement conditions on the quote size, so it is not inconsistent that Boston does better when quotes are higher and also when quotes are set competitively to draw order flow.
Of course, one should be cautious when interpreting these results. For example, our results would not imply that each market center should execute the smallest orders they can attract. What we are observing is that, given the characteristics of a market center and the orders that market center has chosen to attract, the market centers provide more favorable executions for smaller orders. Also, we emphasize again that this does not imply that the executions are favorable in absolute terms relative to the NYSE, but that they are more favorable in certain circumstances. Put another way, effective spreads for Knight are typically larger than for the NYSE, but not so much larger for the smaller orders. The central point of this analysis is that the effectiveness of the strategies employed by various market centers (which are not limited to structural innovation) differs across stocks, suggesting that success is driven by finding profitable niches rather than generally superior systems.
Conclusions
We examine competition among market centers using order level execution statistics.
Our evidence suggests that competition may be best described as market centers developing strategies that allow them to profitably provide execution services to select segments of the market. Our evidence includes the fact that order flows are not similar across market centers, that effective spread differences exist but are related to characteristics of order flow, and that the ability to compete with the NYSE depends on characteristics no related to market center design. Thus, the market for NYSE-listed execution services is one where competition is not perfect and market centers can carve out profitable niches.
Interestingly, the differences in effective spreads for market orders are much smaller in magnitude than the differences in realized spread. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, since the realized spread conditions on the price changes induced by an order, it implicitly controls for order difficulty. By this argument, the differences in effective spreads are not an appropriate basis for comparing execution results. Another interpretation (the two are not mutually exclusive) is that competition may limit potential differences in effective spreads, and that this competition, combined with more difficult order flow being routed to the NYSE, attenuates the profitability of liquidity provision on the NYSE.
Because of differences in order flow characteristics, and the lack of consistency in results (they depend on the order type, size, and stocks examined), drawing broad conclusions about the success of various market architectures is difficult. In fact, we find no evidence that any particular market architecture is uniformly more successful at providing execution. For example, one broker-dealer, Madoff, does quite well, whereas another, Knight, does poorly. More importantly, competition among market centers appears to lead to specialization and fragmentation, not a convergence to a single, dominant, lowest cost architecture. We then present the difference between the given market center and the NYSE. These results exclude any category with less than 10 orders and for which there were observations for less than 10 months. The statistics are calculated across stocks and months. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. . 
